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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
Sam Zylstra (hereinafter "Sam" or "Zylstra") was a senior at Boise State University 
(hereinafter "BSU") in February 2010 when he was injured while wrestling as a heavyweight 
(285-pound class) for the university's nationally-ranked wrestling team. He suffered a 
concussion in his first match at the conference championships, was evaluated by a BSU graduate 
assistant trainer during a requested timeout, and was permitted to continue wrestling. He claims 
in this lawsuit that he should not have been allowed to continue wrestling and that he suffered 
grievous further injuries as a result of that additional strenuous physical activity. He made claim 
against BSU and the State of Idaho (hereinafter "defendants") in October 2010, more than 180 
days after suffering injury, and following denial of the claim filed suit against those parties in 
February 2012. 
Defendants denied that Sam was seriously injured during the wrestling tournament and 
also asserted that his claim was untimely, as it was filed more than 180 days after the initial 
concussion was sustained. Sam argued that his delay in filing was excused as he was in no 
condition to discover he had a claim with respect to the post-timeout injuries during the first 
several months after the tournament, asserting that his claim was, in fact, timely filed under 
applicable law. 
B. Course of Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
In the spring of 2013 defendants filed a motion seeking an order compelling more 
complete disclosures regarding Sam's expert witnesses, and a hearing was held, attended 
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telephonically by both of Sam's attorneys on May 9. Tr Vol. 1, pp. 5-31. Defendants argued 
that Sam's list of expert witnesses, which was timely served on April 8, was inadequate as it did 
not provide detailed information about the substantive opinions of the experts, their billing rates, 
or other information required under LR.C.P. 26. The Honorable Cheri Copsey, noting that the 
Order governing the case schedule in this case did not require such detail but also noting that 
there were outstanding unanswered interrogatories requesting such information, declined to rule 
on the Motion to Compel but warned all counsel of the need to answer and supplement answers 
to outstanding discovery. Tr Vol. 1, p. 12, L. 11-20; Tr Vol. 1, p. 23, L. 24-25; Tr Vol. 1, p. 24, 
L. 1-9. Sam's counsel recall that they advised the Court and defense counsel of a scheduled 
examination of Sam in Seattle in early June by one of his listed experts (the details of this 
disclosure are disputed, as more fully described below) and believed complete discovery 
responses regarding expected expert testimony, could be provided shortly after that June 
appointment without running afoul of the judge's warnings. 
On or about June 4, 2013, defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting 
that Sam had failed to provide evidence of medical causation and further asserting that his claim 
was not timely. In response to this Motion, Sam provided detailed affidavits from his two 
medical experts, Randall Epperson, Ph.D., and Daniel Brzusek, D.O., stating their opinions that 
the decision to allow Sam to continue wrestling after his initial concussion had likely caused him 
additional damage. R Vol. 1, pp. 000539-000554; R Vol. 1, pp. 000508-000538. Dr. Epperson 
also opined that Sam's memory was so impaired after the tournament, and his physical 
symptoms of headaches, nausea, photophobia, and fatigue so severe, that he probably was unable 
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to evaluate whether he had a claim for months afterward. Additionally, Sam provided affidavits 
from his wife, mother, a close friend and housemate, and that friend's father, reciting their 
observations of his impairment in those early months. R Vol. 1, pp. 000493-000507. 
Following receipt of the affidavits filed in opposition to their Motion, defendants moved 
to strike the medical affidavits in their entirety and also asked the Court to strike large portions 
of the lay witnesses' affidavits, primarily on grounds of hearsay. A hearing was held on August 
8 at which Judge Copsey ruled that Dr. Brzusek's affidavit was provided too late and would thus 
be stricken and that while Dr. Epperson's lengthy report of his initial evaluation of Sam had been 
provided to defense counsel long before their Motion for Summary Judgment was filed, his 
opinion supporting medical causation was a "new" opinion and should have been disclosed 
before the motion was filed. She therefore struck his affidavit, which resulted in her granting the 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the medical causation issue. Tr Vol. 1, pp. 32-117, 
particularly Tr Vol. 1, p. 71, L. 22-25; Tr Vol. 1, p. 72, L. 1-21. Sam argued that the opinion was 
not new at all and further argued that defendants had not been surprised or prejudiced by the 
timing of Dr. Epperson's affidavit. With respect to defendants' assertions that the claim was not 
timely, Judge Copsey ruled that the lay witness affidavits, while partly inadmissible, were 
admissible as to the witnesses' personal observations of Sam, and those observations, evaluated 
in light of precedent, including Larson v. Emmett Joint Sch. Dist. No. 221, 99 Idaho 120, 577 
P.2d 1168 (1978), justified a jury trial on the issue of whether the delay in filing the claim was 
excusable. Tr Vol. 1, p. 82, L. 3-18; Tr Vol. 1, p. 100, L. 4-8; Tr Vol. 1, p. 104, L. 3-21. 
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Because Sam had listed only the two medical experts for the issue of medical causation, 
judgment was entered against him on August 15,2013. At the conclusion of the oral hearing on 
August 8 and prior to entry of the judgment, Sam's counsel moved for a continuance of the trial 
to address the suggestion that defendants had been prejudiced by the timing of Dr. Epperson's 
affidavit. Tr Vol. 1, p. 115, L. 19-25; Tr Vol. 1, p. 116, L. 1-9. Judge Copsey denied the motion 
but invited, or seemed to invite, Sam to file "an actual motion because judgment has not been 
entered." Tr Vol. 1, p. 116, L. 14-23. Noting that the Order governing the case proceedings 
required any Motion for Continuance to be in writing, Sam's counsel filed a joint written Motion 
for ContinuancelReconsideration on August 12, before the judgment was entered. R Vol. 1, pp. 
000654-000724. Hearing on that motion occurred on October 10, Sam's counsel again attending 
by telephone, and Judge Copsey denied both a continuance and the request for reconsideration. 
Tr Vol. 1, pp. 118-167. 
C. Statement of Facts 
On February 26, 2010, Sam Zylstra was wrestling in his first match at the Pac-1O 
tournament, held that year in Davis, California. He was thrown to the mat by his opponent, an 
Oregon State University wrestler he had defeated only a couple of weeks before, and suffered a 
concussion (his forehead took the brunt of his contact with the mat). His coaches called a 
timeout to assess the severity of his injury and to determine whether it was safe for him to 
continue the match. Graduate assistant athletic trainer Andy Chorn, who was designated by BSU 
to evaluate wrestlers' injuries, examined Sam during a 90-second timeout, later noting on a 
report he completed that day that Sam reported a headache and showed signs of confusion and 
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dizziness. R Vol. 1, pp. 000335-000355; R Vol. 1, pp. 000341-000342. Mr. Chom has testified 
that Sam's symptoms cleared before the timeout had expired, and he allowed him to continue 
wrestling. Sam lost that first match but was allowed to participate in the remaining matches of 
the tournament, one more match that day and two the following day, where he fared well enough 
to place fifth and qualify for the NCAA Championships. Roughly two weeks after the 
tournament, when Sam continued to complain of headaches, memory loss, photophobia, and 
other symptoms of concussion, Doctor Scot Scheffel examined him at the trainer's request and 
opined that Sam had suffered a "significant concussion." Dr. Scheffel told Sam he would not be 
cleared to wrestle in the NCAA Championships later that month. R Vol. 1, p. 000492. 
Although Sam to this day believes he has no independent recollection of the timeout, or 
anything that happened for months afterward, he now contends, based on the available evidence, 
that the trainer should not have allowed him to continue wrestling without physician approval, 
which was never obtained prior to conclusion of the tournament. He contends that the extreme 
physical exertion required of him in wrestling after the initial concussion caused further brain 
injury that caused significant and permanent damage. Nearly four years after the tournament, he 
still suffers the effects of brain injury,· including extreme anxiety, paranoia, and anti-social 
behaviors that have prevented him from maintaining stable employment and caused severe stress 
to himself and his family. He was unable to complete his studies or obtain his degree at BSU, 
despite good grades prior to his injuries, and he was medically discharged from the ROTC 
program at the school, terminating his plans to seek a commission in the Army upon graduation. 
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The crux of this appeal relates to Sam's medical experts' opinions. Both of them opined 
that Sam should not have been allowed to continue wrestling after his initial concussion, and 
both opined on the basis of reasonable scientific or medical probability or certainty that allowing 
him to continue wrestling caused additional, significant damages, stating that it was likely he 
would have recovered completely from his initial concussion within a couple of weeks if he had 
not suffered further damage by continued wrestling. As set forth in greater detail in the 
Argument section, Sam contends that he had adequately and timely disclosed his experts' 
opinions to defendants. 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court judge manifestly abused her discretion in striking Sam's 
experts' affidavits? 
2. Whether the trial judge was impartial and disinterested in the outcome of the case 
and, ifnot, whether her failure in that regard requires reversal of her decision? 
V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Sam does not seek attorney fees on this appeal. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. The Appellate Standard of Review of Motions for Summary Judgment is the Same as that 
Employed by the Trial Court. 
This Court applies the same standard of review the trial court is required to apply to 
motions for summary judgment. The rule has been repeated in numerous decisions, including 
this Court's decision in Edmunds v. Kraner, et al., 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006). If the 
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pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. The Court must view the facts and inferences 
in the record in favor of the non-moving party. Id., 142 Idaho at 871, 136 P.3d at 342. Had there 
been no dispute whether Sam's experts' opinions were timely produced, there can be little doubt 
that defendants' motion should have been denied, as the affidavits clearly raised genuine issues 
of material fact as to medical causation (and timeliness). 
In this case, however, defendants insisted they were surprised by Sam's experts' 
oplmons. Under Idaho law, the admissibility of affidavits under I.R.C.P. 56(e) is considered a 
threshold question to be evaluated before applying the "liberal construction and reasonable 
inferences rules required when reviewing motions for summary judgment." Id., 142 Idaho at 
871, 136 P.3d at 342, citing Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 
(1994). Sam understands that defendants are not arguing that his experts' affidavits were 
deficient in any way other than being untimely (encompassing the allegation they contained new 
opinions), so the question is whether they were; in fact, untimely and new and can accordingly 
be stricken within the trial judge's discretion. 
B. Evidentiary Rulings at the Trial Court Level are Committed to the Discretion of the Trial 
Judge and Are Not Reversed Except for Manifest Abuse of that Discretion, Subject 
Always to The Test Whether the Decision was Inconsistent With Substantial Justice. 
Trial court rulings on evidentiary issues in Idaho are reviewed on an abuse of discretion 
standard. The standard has been defined and explained repeatedly in Idaho cases in the same 
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terms, sometimes where a judge has sanctionedl a party for violations of discovery orders and 
sometimes for violations of pretrial orders per the terms ofLR.C.P. 37(b) or LR.C.P. 16(i). This 
Court in the Edmunds decision, supra, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006), citing other 
decisions, stated the rules as follows: 
The imposition of such sanctions is committed to the discretion of the trial court, 
and we will not overturn such a decision absent a manifest abuse of that 
discretion. S. Idaho Prod.Credit Ass 'n. v. Astorquia, 113 Idaho 526, 528, 746 
P.2d 985, 987 (1987). When determining whether a district court abused its 
discretion, this Court considers three factors: (1) whether the trial court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether it acted within the boundaries 
of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal principles, and (3) whether 
it reached its decision through an exercise of reason. Lamar Corp. v. City a/Twin 
Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 40, 981 P.2d 1146, 1150 (1999). 
Edmunds, supra, 142 Idaho at 872-873, 136 P.3d at 343-344. In this case the judge announced at 
the end of the summary judgment hearing that the issue was one of discretion (Tr Vol. 1, p. 116, 
L. 24-25), so the first prong of the test seems to have been satisfied. Sam asserts the second and 
third prongs were not satisfied. Unfortunately, research reveals little information to flesh out 
precisely what those portions of the test really mean. Sam believes, however, that Judge Copsey 
failed to act within the appropriate boundaries of her discretion utilizing applicable legal 
principles, and while she gave reasons for her decision, the decision cannot fairly be described as 
resulting from an exercise of reason as it ignored a number of relevant facts, misstated on 
1 Judge Copsey insisted in her oral ruling on Sam's Motion for ContinuancelReconsideration that her grant of 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was not a sanction, although she also held that her decision was based 
on a violation of the discovery rules. Tr Vol. 1, p. 160, L. 16-25; Tr Vol. 1, p. 69, L. 6-10. Notably, she had never 
issued a discovery order aside from the instructions contained in the Order Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial. 
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numerous occasions the relevant time periods for which an evaluation of timeliness could 
appropriately be made, and suggests that she was not acting with the disinterest required of Idaho 
judges. 
Sam's counsel acknowledge at the outset that with the benefit of hindsight they wish they 
had taken steps to formally supplement their answers to defendants' interrogatories related to 
Sam's experts' opinions, particularly Dr. Epperson's, prior to the filing of defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, however, Sam believes that there is no 
justification for striking their affidavits under the circumstances of this case, including the lack 
of evidence of intentional wrongdoing on his or his counsel's part, their good-faith belief that 
discovery was continuing at the time defendants filed their motion, and the absence of credible 
evidence that defendants were prejudiced by anything Sam's counsel did or did not do. 
Ultimately, the decision should be overturned because it is inconsistent with substantial justice, 
the test that encompasses the abuse of discretion standard described above. This test was set 
forth in a number of cases: 
[n]o error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or 
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any 
of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for 
vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to 
take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The 
court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
Schmechel v. Dille, MD., 148 Idaho 176, 180, 219 P.3d 1192, 1196 (2009). See also 
Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., Ltd, 127 Idaho 565, 575, 903 P.2d 730, 740 (1995). 
For those reasons and others, as explained more fully below, Sam respectfully submits 
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that the Court's striking both of the subj ect affidavits (of Drs. Epperson and Brzusek) was 
a manifest abuse of discretion and inconsistent with substantial justice. 
C. The District Court's Order was Based, in part, on the Need to Prevent Trial by 
Ambush, But There was No Evidence That Sam Intended to Engage, Or Had 
Engaged, in Such Tactics. 
The trial judge stated early in her oral ruling, at the hearing of defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on August 8, 2013, that Sam was required to respond in a timely fashion to 
discovery requests "so that we do not have a trial by ambush." Tr Vol. 1, p. 46, L. 9-12. That 
was a recurring theme in her rulings, although described sometimes in different terms. There 
was certainly no intent to engage in such tactics, and Sam believes defendants had a good 
understanding of his claims on the issues relevant to this appeal, and the expert opinions that 
would support them, long before they filed their motion for summary judgment. 
Sam's claim letter, received by defendants on October 22, 2010, had described the 
material elements of his claim, notably explaining the portion of the claim establishing causation 
as follows: 
We assert that allowing him [Sam] to continue [after he had suffered a concussion 
in his first match at the conference championships] wrestling, a violent, physical 
sport, more probably than not aggravated his symptoms and caused the significant 
damages that followed including his prolonged almost complete short-term 
memory loss and cognitive and behavioral impairment. During his long period of 
incapacity we contend it cannot be said that he reasonably should have discovered 
that he had a claim. (bracketed language added to clarify meaning) 
Tr Vol. 1, p. 40, L. 1-10. 
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In all material respects Sam's claim has never wavered from that statement with respect 
to the issue of medical causation. As more fully described in the following section, Sam 
reiterated that the view recited in the original claim letter was the opinion of Dr. Randall 
Epperson, whose extensive report of his neuropsychological evaluation of Sam was mailed to 
defendants in late January 2012. 
By the time defendants' motion for summary judgment was heard, Sam felt that it was 
defendants who could have been cited for trial-by-ambush tactics. Although Sam had 
propounded interrogatories to defendants asking for their experts' opinions, prior to filing their 
motion for summary judgment they did not provide any substantive opinions, either through their 
List of Experts filed on or about May 8, 2013, or in answers to interrogatories. R Vol. 1, pp. 
000149-000152. Their excuse was that they did not have enough information from Sam's 
experts to know what opinions would be relevant, despite the fact they had received Dr. 
Epperson's report in late January or early February 2012, a brief statement of his expected 
testimony on causation in Sam's List of Experts, served on defense counsel on April 8, 2013, and 
a written statement of the liability opinions of Sam's expert athletic trainer, Bill Drake, provided 
to defense counsel on April 19, 2013. R Vol. 1, p. 000140. Defense counsel advised Sam's 
counsel on July 12,2013, after they had filed their motion for summary judgment (and after the 
alleged discovery deadline they apparently were content to invoke at that time, despite evidence 
there had been an implicit agreement that discovery would be extended), that their liability 
expert had developed a conflict necessitating they replace him at that time. R Vol. 1, p. 000708. 
As they had never provided any opinion from a liability expert, despite Sam's having 
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propounded interrogatories for that purpose, their announcement suggested to Sam's counsel, as 
had other evidence (see below), that it was understood discovery would continue. When the trial 
judge repeatedly emphasized at the summary judgment hearing that Sam's disclosures were 
untimely for being made after the discovery deadline, defense counsel said nothing,2 and, indeed, 
they made no comment about Sam's assertion that there had been an implicit agreement to 
continue discovery, contained in his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, when they 
filed their reply brief. 
As the trial judge rightly pointed out at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, 
she did not have before her a motion from Sam complaining about defendants' discovery 
failures. None had been filed, and Sam is aware of this Court's pronouncements in that regard in 
the Edmunds case. The substance of these complaints, however, does seem relevant at this point 
given the admonitions by the trial judge concerning Sam's or his counsel's perceived 
deficiencies and trial tactics, in the context of her other pronouncements and Sam's belief that 
she failed to exhibit the disinterest required of judges (see more below). 
D. In Conjunction With the Concept of Untimeliness, the Trial Judge's Decision Was 
Premised on her View that the Expert Opinions Disclosed by Sam on July 1, 2013, Were 
"New," But They Were Not New in Any Legally Significant Way. 
The decision to grant defendants' motion for summary judgment was grounded in the 
trial judge's belief that the expert opinions of Drs. Epperson and Brzusek were "new," that is, 
2 To be fair, Mr. Schmitz did state at the hearing on Sam's motion for reconsideration that defendants had never 
"stipulated" to an extension of discovery. 
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dramatically different from anything disclosed before such that they altered the case for 
defendants and denied them an adequate opportunity to prepare for a full cross-examination 
given what she perceived was the close of discovery. Tr Vol. 1, p. 70, L. 20-25; Tr Vol. 1, p. 71, 
L. 1-8. Her decision thus depended on the premise that the opinions had not previously been 
disclosed in any meaningful way, that defendants did not have enough information to prepare for 
cross-examination before trial, and that discovery had closed. Sam respectfully submits that 
none of those premises withstands scrutiny. 
1. There Was Prior Disclosure. 
As noted above, the initial claim letter submitted to defendants by Sam in October 2010 
clearly identified the contours of Sam's claim on causation. Further, Dr. Randall Epperson had 
provided a thorough report (24 pages long) concerning his in-person evaluation of Sam in 
California on November 17, 2011, which had been mailed to defendants on January 28, 2012. 
The report was requested by Sam's counsel primarily for the purpose of evaluating the extent of 
Sam's damages, and their cause to a lesser extent, but at that preliminary stage, before a lawsuit 
had been filed, no attempt was made to ask for a legally-sufficient report of opinions couched in 
terms of reasonable scientific certainty on the various elements of Sam's claim. Dr. Epperson's 
report nonetheless addressed preliminarily the question whether Sam's considerable damages 
could be related to his wrestling injuries, and Dr. Epperson noted that Sam's significant and 
persistent memory loss and cognitive damages suggested the presence of more than a single 
concussive event. R Vol. 1, p. 000603. In counsel's discussions with Dr. Epperson after receipt 
of his report, counsel understood that if asked whether he had an opinion that defendants' 
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allowing Sam to continue wrestling after his initial concussion had caused additional damage, 
Dr. Epperson would have said that he did think it more probable than not that the additional 
wrestling had, in fact, caused additional damage, as it was statistically improbable that a single 
concussion, from which a full recovery is normally expected within a couple of weeks, would 
have caused the extraordinary, continuing damages Sam was exhibiting. 
For several reasons Sam's counsel assumed well before defense counsel filed their 
motion for summary judgment that they understood what Dr. Epperson's opinions were about 
causation. The report itself was not ideal in communicating those opinions, as Dr. Epperson 
naturally wanted to leave the door open for further information that might be developed before 
committing to a final opinion on causation, and he wrote his report using the word "possible" in 
some places and referring to the significant damages due to a "concussion" or "concussions," but 
he stated at page 22 of his report that "Further information would be helpful, but prolonged post-
traumatic amnesia for four months suggests the likelihood of subsequent concussions. The 
significant current range of dysfunction deficits also suggests more than one concussion." R. 
VoL 1, p. 000603. Because he already had detected prolonged post-traumatic amnesia in Sam, 
counsel believed from the date he received this report that in the absence of evidence of any 
other source for injury shortly after the wrestling tournament, and there seemed to be none, Dr. 
Epperson would opine with reasonable neuropsychological or scientific certainty that continuing 
to wrestle after the first concussion had caused the significant additional injuries he had found 
during his neuropsychological evaluation of Sam because he had reported that the prolonged 
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post-traumatic amnesia and current range of dysfunction deficits "suggests the likelihood" of 
subsequent concussions. 
Another reason why defendants were assumed to have understood Dr. Epperson's views 
on causation is that in Sam's List of Experts, timely served on defense counsel on April 8, 2013, 
nearly two full months before defendants filed their motion for summary judgment, Sam 
identified Dr. Epperson as a witness expected to testify at trial, and after identifying the subject 
areas on which he would offer opinions, recited the following: 
He is further expected to testify that defendants breached the applicable standard 
of care in allowing plaintiff to continue wrestling after his initial brain injury 
during his first match in the Pac-lO wrestling championships on February 26, 
2010, and that it is likely plaintiff suffered multiple lesser brain injuries during 
subsequent matches, which caused the severe and likely permanent cognitive and 
behavioral deficits plaintiff suffered. Dr. Epperson will testify specifically about 
the damages in plaintiff's functioning as revealed by the neuropsychological tests 
Dr. Epperson administered to plaintiff on November 17, 2011. 
R Vol. 1, p. 000064. The announcement of what Dr. Epperson would say about causation in this 
List of Experts was what he said in greater detail in his affidavit served on July 1, 2013 (R Vol. 
1, pp. 000539-000554), in response to defendants' motion for summary judgment and cannot be 
considered to have been "new" in a way that could have altered the case, as Judge Copsey said it 
did, or prejudiced defendants. Unlike the "new" affidavit of Dr. Hollander in the Edmunds case, 
supra, which apparently had for the first time addressed a material element of plaintiff s claim, 
namely, the local community standard of care in a medical malpractice case, Dr. Epperson's 
affidavit said essentially what the April 8 List of Experts had advised he would say. 
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Defendants have argued, and the trial judge seems to have accepted, that it is not enough 
to say in a List of Experts that an expert is "expected to say" one thing or another, but it is 
respectfully submitted that they misinterpret that phrase. The suggestion was made by the trial 
judge that all Sam had done was advise the general subject matter of his experts' expected 
testimony (that is, testimony about liability, damages, etc.)(Tr Vol. 1, p. 154, L. 19-25; Tr Vol. 1, 
p. 155, L. 1-6), but Sam's List of Experts was very specific about Dr. Epperson's opinions on 
causation, that it was likely Sam had suffered additional injuries after suffering the first 
concussion and that those injuries caused substantial further damages. R Vol. 1, p. 000064. 
Still another reason why it was believed defense counsel understood the scope of Dr. 
Epperson's expected testimony is that at the hearing on defendants' Motion to Compel, which 
according to defense counsel Phil Collaer's own remarks related only to his objections to the 
perceived inadequacy of Sam's List of Experts (as defendants had by that time received answers 
to defendants' first and second interrogatories - Tr Vol. 1, p. 7, L. 8-10), Mr. Collaer made the 
following introductory remarks: "I don't have a quarrel with Dr. Epperson's report or the fact 
that he was disclosed, his opinions are in the report. I don't have a quarrel with that. The 
problem I do have is the remaining experts, the disclosure simply did not disclose their opinions 
in the expert disclosure." (Emphasis added.) Tr Vol. 1, p. 9, L. 19-25. In short, he left the 
impression he found the disclosure of Dr. Epperson's opinions sufficient and understandable at 
that time. 
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2. Defendants Had More Than Adequate Infonnation to Prepare for Cross-
Examination of Sam's Experts. 
Even if one disregards Mr. Collaer's foregoing comments indicating he had as of May 
2013 no problem with the disclosures related to Dr. Epperson, it cannot be plausibly argued that 
defendants had inadequate infonnation to prepare for cross-examination of Dr. Epperson. They 
had been afforded an opportunity to review Dr. Epperson's lengthy report of his examination of 
Sam for more than fifteen months prior to filing their motion for summary judgment. Even if 
one were to assume that they did not read or understand the description of his expected testimony 
in the List of Experts provided on April 8,2013, and that they did not understand the portion of 
his report quoted above relating to causation, they certainly had a roadmap as to the contours of 
his opinions on causation. If they reviewed Sam's List of Experts, the map was even more clear. 
Had they chosen to depose Dr. Epperson, they would have known exactly what to ask him to 
clarify his opinions. All they had to do was ask him to explain what they considered ambiguous 
language in his report about causation, ask him whether he believed Sam had suffered additional 
concussions wrestling at the tournament after suffering his first injury there, etc. The trial 
judge's suggestion that defendants were left with such incomplete infonnation that they would 
have had to engage in a fishing expedition (Tr Vol. 1, p. 159, L. 11-17) is simply not tenable. 
As for experts other than Dr. Epperson, Sam had provided statements from his athletic 
trainer witness (the primary liability witness) and his economist prior to defendants' filing their 
motion for summary judgment. The one expert whose written opinions were not available at the 
time of the motion's filing was Dr. Daniel Brzusek. He had been listed as an expert on the April 
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8 List of Experts, and his expected testimony had been fleshed out further in a supplemental List 
of Experts served on defendants on April 29. R Vol. 1, p. 000619. That document identified 
further information about his expected testimony in light of counsel's consultations with him: 
"In particular he will testity that the medical literature confirms that allowing an athlete to return 
to competition before his brain injury has had time to recover can lead to multiple brain injuries, 
or death, that could have been avoided with proper rest." R Vol. 1, p. 000623. Dr. Brzusek 
advised he wanted to meet with Sam and evaluate him face-to-face. That could not be arranged 
until June 10, 2013, which as it turns out was six days after defendants filed their motion for 
summary judgment but, according to counsel's understanding, before there was any agreement to 
close discovery (see below). Both of Sam's attorneys recall that the scheduled meeting had been 
brought to the court's and defense counsel's attention during the hearing on defendants' motion 
to compel, but the transcript does not reflect the statements counsel recall were made about it? 
As indicated in the transcript of the motion for continuance/reconsideration (Tr Vol. 1, p. 121, L. 
4-25; Tr Vol. 1, p. 122, L. 1-12; Tr Vol. 1, p. 124, L. 4-23) undersigned counsel acted on the 
assumption that their remarks had been heard, and hearing no objection they thought seasonable 
supplementation of discovery answers, including expert opinions, which the trial judge had 
instructed Sam to provide (without a specific deadline), could be delayed long enough to include 
Dr. Brzusek's OpInIOns. Regardless, Sam believes the judge's decision to strike even Dr. 
3 For what it's worth, Sam's counsel attended the hearing by telephone, Mr. Swindler from his office in Spokane and 
Mr. Whitehead from his office in Seattle, and there were some problems on their end with hearing everything that 
was said in Boise, and perhaps vice versa. 
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Brzusek's affidavit, filed in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, was an abuse of 
discretion because it was consistent with the views of Dr. Epperson on causation and did not 
provide any "new" opinions differing in any material respect from the opinions Dr. Epperson had 
formed that had been described in his report and in the List of Experts and which defense 
counsel seemed to acknowledge were sufficient and understandable. 
3. Sam Reasonably Believed Discovery Had Not Closed. 
The trial judge's decision was also based on the premise that Sam's disclosures were late 
for being made after discovery had closed. Tr Vol. 1, p. 71, L. 1-2. As Mr. Whitehead argued, 
he believed that there was an implicit agreement that discovery was still open. The Order 
Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial issued by Judge Copsey in this case allowed the parties 
to agree to an extension of the discovery deadline (R Vol. 1, pp. 000023), and while there was no 
explicit written agreement, communications between counsel certainly persuaded the 
undersigned that there was an understanding that additional discovery would be conducted. On 
June 3, Mr. Whitehead e-mailed defense counsel requesting a conference about discovery and 
mediation, assuming they would like to depose his experts or key lay witnesses. R Vol. 1, p. 
000706. Mr. Collaer did respond a few days later, after he had filed their motion for summary 
judgment, that his client did not want to mediate until the judge had ruled on their motion, but he 
did not address the issue of further discovery in his response. On July 12, after repeatedly 
complaining that Sam had not appropriately disclosed his experts' opinions, defense counsel 
advised that their liability expert, whose opinions had never been disclosed, had developed a 
conflict necessitating a replacement. R VoL 1, p. 000708. Defense counsel presumably knew 
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that if discovery had been closed, they might not be able to add a completely new witness at that 
late date but did not seek any accommodation from Sam's counsel, simply announcing that they 
were replacing their liability expert. Sam had identified his athletic trainer liability expert on 
April 8 and had provided his written statement of his opinions on April 19. R Vol. 1, pp. 
000036, 000140. On July 19 defense counsel requested production of specified documents, 
including some documents that had already been produced, which was called to their attention on 
July 22 (R Vol. 1, pp. 000710, 000712), Sam's counsel advising, however, that he would check 
as to the other requested documents. 
E. The Trial Judge Held that Sam Did Not Seasonably Supplement His Disclosures, but She 
Did Not Impose a Deadline, and Sam's Intent was to Supplement Them Within Roughly 
a Month of the Hearing on the Motion to Compel, After Receiving Dr. Brzusek's Report. 
A point of emphasis in the trial court's decision granting defendants' motion for 
summary judgment was that she had made it very clear that Sam needed to provide further 
disclosures regarding his experts by way of "seasonable" supplementation. Tr Vol. 1, p. 71, 1. 
22-25; Tr Vol. 1, p. 72,1. 7-13. She declined to rule on defendants' Motion to Compel, noting 
that in her view the List of Experts required by her Order Governing Proceedings and Setting 
Trial did not require the level of detail required by LR.C.P. 26(b)(4). Tr Vol. 1, p. 12,1. 11-17; 
Tr Vol. 1, p. 23, 1. 24-25; Tr Vol. 1, p. 24,1. 1-2. Believing that Dr. Epperson's views had been 
sufficiently described to defendants, as well as the opinions of Sam's liability expert and 
economist, and also believing it was understood Sam was to see Dr. Brzusek in early June, 
Sam's counsel decided it made sense, consistent with their understanding of "seasonable 
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supplementation," to await Dr. Brzusek's written report before providing his opinion and further 
supplementation, as necessary, of their other experts' opinions. 
This Court has not to the undersigned's knowledge attempted to define with precision 
what must be provided, and when, to comply with a requirement of "seasonable 
supplementation." Indeed, in the Edmunds case, supra, the Court noted that the drafters of Rule 
26 left considerable discretion to the trial judge to determine what is required. This Court further 
noted that an important inquiry in evaluating the issue is whether the moving party (seeking an 
order to compel) was given an opportunity for full cross examination. If the answer to that 
question is "yes," this Court held there is probably no abuse of discretion in admitting the 
testimony. Edmunds, supra, 142 Idaho at 875, 136 P.3d at 346. While that is not equivalent to 
saying that a court's imposing a sanction (such as striking affidavits) cannot ever be justified if 
the opposing party was given an opportunity for full cross examination, Sam suggests that should 
be the outcome under the circumstances of this case for the reasons already stated and those to 
follow. This is not a case where the ultimate sanction, dismissal of a claim by virtue of striking 
affidavits, can be justified. 
In this case, the affidavits of Drs. Epperson and Brzusek were supplemented in detail in 
their affidavits of July 1, 2013, R Vol. 1, pp. 000539-000554; R Vol. 1, pp. 000508-000538, and 
again by detailed supplementation of answers to interrogatories served on defense counsel on 
July 15,2013. R Vol. 1, pp. 000666-000703. Their opinions were not "new" in any meaningful 
way, as they were consistent with the theory of the case as articulated in October 2010, 
consistent with Dr. Epperson's comprehensive report of examination mailed to defendants in late 
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January 2012, and repeated in the description of his expected testimony in Sam's List of Experts 
on April 8,2013. 
Even if the affidavits were considered to provide new information, they were provided a 
full three months before trial (and the discovery answers, which Sam felt were simply a summary 
in a more formal format of what had previously been disclosed, a full ten weeks before trial). 
There was really no reason to think that imposed any prejudice or undue burden on defendants, 
who had not provided their own liability expert's opinions before July 12 and didn't seem to be a 
source of concern to Mr. Collaer, who announced at the hearing on his Motion to Compel on 
May 9 that his motion related only to the sufficiency of Sam's List of Experts and not his 
discovery answers (Tr Vol. 1, p. 7, L. 8-10) and further noted that because the trial was in 
September, the parties had time to resolve this issue and indicated that his fear was that without a 
full disclosure of opinions fairly soon, the parties might come to September without resolution, 
and he would need to move to exclude witnesses then, a result he said he wanted to avoid. Tr 
Vol. 1, p. 10, L. 15-25. As noted previously, there was no suggestion there was anything 
deficient about the disclosures regarding Dr. Epperson's opinions, but there was also no reason 
to think Mr. Collaer was planning to move to exclude witnesses three months before trial. 
Even if the doctors' affidavits filed on July 1 are deemed to have contained new opinions 
that altered the case, it is clear that is not enough to justifY striking them in the absence of other 
reasons. It is clear under Idaho law that experts are allowed to change their opinions in the 
course of a case, and striking their "new" opinions can be viewed as the result of a judge's 
assessing the experts' credibility, which is not appropriate under applicable legal principles at the 
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summary judgment stage. Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 419, 283 
P.3d 728, 736 (2012). 
Finally, although Judge Copsey repeatedly insisted she had been very clear in her 
instructions, at the hearing on the Motion to Compel, as to what was expected of Sam, in her 
closing remarks at the hearing, she made the following statements: 
So I guess, Mr. Collaer at this point what I would suggest is let's leave this open 
where I don't make a decision, except I think I've put everybody on notice the 
way I see it. You go through the discovery that you have. If you want to renew 
your motion - - I'm not denying the motion at this point, but I don't think I can 
grant it either. I think that I need to have - - you need to set out exactly what it is 
that's missing. 
Tr Vol. 1, p. 23, L. 24-25; Tr Vol. 1, p. 24, L. 1-7. At that point, Sam had a reasonable 
expectation that if Mr. Collaer upon further review had any concerns about the scope and extent 
of expert disclosures, there would at least be another Motion to Compel before Sam would face a 
motion to strike his experts' opinions. 
F. The Trial Court's Decision Ignored Applicable Legal Principles, Was Not the Product of 
an Exercise of Reason, and Was Not Consistent with the Disinterest Required of Trial 
Judges. 
It is the law in Idaho that the district court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard 
any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
Schmechel, supra, 148 Idaho at 180, 219 P.3d at 1196. Although Judge Copsey apparently 
believes otherwise, it is respectfully submitted that any errors that Sam's counsel made in 
misunderstanding her directives or their discovery obligations with respect to their experts' 
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opinions did not affect, or prejudice, any substantial rights of defendants. They had adequate 
information about Sam's experts' opinions to prepare well for cross-examination no later than 
July 1, 2013, three full months before trial, and there was at the least a reasonable basis for 
Sam's belief at that time that the parties had implicitly agreed to extend discovery. 
In addition to the imperative that errors should be disregarded unless they affect 
substantial rights of the parties, the law is clear in Idaho, as elsewhere, that judges must at all 
times show disinterest in the outcome of the case when making decisions. Edmunds, supra, 142 
Idaho at 875, 136 P.3d at 346 ("It is clear under our rules that courts must remain 
disinterested .... "). The Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct also requires, of course, that judges shall 
perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. Canon 3 B. (6). Sam is very reluctant to 
assert that Judge Copsey was biased against him, his attorneys, or his claim, but her statements in 
court, including disregard of important facts and timelines, inconsistent rulings and reversal of 
opinion, as well as her written Order Awarding Costs dated October 11, 2013 (R Vol. 1, pp. 
000758-000762), show evidence that she was for some reason not appropriately disinterested in 
the outcome of this case. 
Sam is well aware that appellate courts will not find judicial bias without substantial 
evidence that a judge's hostility to a litigant, his counsel, or his claim is "so extreme as to display 
clear inability to render fair judgment." Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 791, 229 P.3d 1146, 
1153 (2010), citing and endorsing the principles of Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 114 
S.Ct. 1147, 127 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1994). See also Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 
Idaho 752, 250 P.3d 803 (2011). The full extent of this judge's bias was not apparent to Sam 
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until counsel had an opportunity to review carefully the full transcript of the hearings that are a 
part of this record on appeal as well as her written Order Awarding Costs. Viewed in their 
entirety, the judge's comments from the bench, and her Orders, leave the firm impression that for 
whatever reason she was unable to render a fair judgment in this case. 
A number of the judge's comments about time periods initially seemed offhand and 
innocuous but for their relationship to her decision about the timeliness of Sam's expert 
disclosures. She stated repeatedly, for example, that the period for making a claim against a 
State entity was 120 days, when in fact that time period had been amended to 180 days ("from 
the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later" - Idaho 
Code §6-905). Tr Vol. 1, p. 36, L. 7; Tr Vol. 1, p. 63, L. 20-25; Tr Vol. 1, p. 64, L. 1-4, 13-16 
("any attorney would know there is 120-day notice requirement to comply with the state Tort 
Claims Act"). Judge Copsey also stated at the hearing on defendants' motion for summary 
judgment that trial was a little less than six weeks away (Tr Vol. 1, p. 32, L. 24-25; Tr Vol. 1, p. 
33, L. 1), when it was then actually seven weeks and four days away. While this may seem to 
have been an innocent and trivial mistake, it was part of a pattern of emphasizing dates and 
deadlines in such a way as to make her decision that the disclosures were too late seem 
justifiable. In this particular instance, the proximity of the trial date to the hearing date was 
actually irrelevant to the question whether the disclosures were untimely because the affidavits in 
question had been served five weeks before the hearing and a full three months before trial. Sam 
had no responsibility for the timing of the hearing date. 
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At the hearing on Sam's motion for continuance/reconsideration, the judge said "I don't 
think it's appropriate to have experts meeting with your client for the first time after discovery 
and just - really just prior to trial," then referencing the hearing date (which she then correctly 
noted had been seven weeks and a few days before trial). Tr Vol. 1, p. 165, 1. 8-14. 
Presumably, she was speaking only of Dr. Brzusek in that remark, as Dr. Epperson had met Sam 
for the first time in November 2011. But Dr. Brzusek's appointment with Sam was on June 10, 
2013, a full 16 weeks before trial, making the hearing date completely irrelevant and raising 
questions why she thought the meeting was "really just prior to trial." Defense counsel may 
have contributed to the confusion when he argued at the hearing on the motion for 
reconsideration that Sam's supplementation of his experts' opinions "happened just before trial 
was supposed to start" (Tr Vol. 1, p. 136,1. 11-12). 
In support of her decision to strike Sam's experts' affidavits, the judge also misstated 
evidence that she seemed to think important. Perhaps intending to contrast defendants' actions 
with Sam's, as she perceived them, the judge asserted that defendants had disclosed their 
experts' opinions on May 8, well before the discovery cutoff she thought applied. Tr Vol. 1, p. 
65, 1. 6-7. However, as Sam argued at the hearing on the summary judgment motion, 
defendants' May List of Experts did not disclose any substantive opinions about causation or 
even liability, despite their having been provided Sam's liability expert's written opinion on 
April 19. R Vol. 1, pp. 000661-000663. Defendants' opinions were first disclosed in affidavits 
accompanying their motion for summary judgment, but defendants were quick to criticize Sam 
for his alleged failure to provide his experts' opinions prior to responding to their motion. 
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Additionally, defendants never provided written answers to Sam's interrogatories requesting 
their experts' opinions, or provided any supplementation, and as noted above, actually named a 
new liability expert (their only liability expert) on July 12. R Vol. 1, p. 000708. 
Apparently for the purpose of suggesting there was no new evidence justifying the "new" 
opinions and "previously undisclosed opinions of Dr. Epperson" provided in the July 1 
affidavits, Judge Copsey noted that despite defendants' having "disclosed" their expert opinions 
on May 8,2013, Sam had failed to disclose any rebuttal experts by May 22. Tr Vol. 1, p. 155, L. 
19-22. Of course, Sam denies that the opinions provided by affidavit on July 1 were new to 
defendants, but his failure to disclose any rebuttal experts by May 22 would have been 
independently justified by defendants' failure to provide any expert opinions at all on May 8 
from which he could have determined then that rebuttal experts might be necessary. 
In announcing her decision to strike both of Sam's experts' affidavits, Judge Copsey used 
language designed apparently to portray trial-by-ambush tactics to which she had previously 
alluded. Without providing guidance as to exactly when "seasonable" supplementation would 
have been due, the judge said that in the face of an express warning at the hearing on the motion 
to compel, "the plaintiff had an opportunity to immediately seasonably supplement those." Tr 
Vol. 1, p. 72, L. 7-10. She went on to say: "Instead, the plaintiff waited until the motion was 
filed and at that time sprang new and different opinions on the plaintiff [sic]. For that reason I 
strike both affidavits." Tr Vol. 1, p. 72, L. 18-21. 
In earlier remarks at the same hearing emphasizing that trial by ambush is unacceptable, 
the judge said "the only way that the defendants could fairly be able to have an opportunity for 
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full cross-examination would be for the Court to continue the trial. That is the only way. We do 
not have trial by ambush." Tr Vol. 1, p. 71, L. 4-8. Although Sam did not want a continuance or 
think it necessary for either side, at the end of the hearing he moved for a continuance as a means 
of addressing the judge's concerns that defendants would otherwise be prejudiced. Judge 
Copsey denied the motion, after hearing from defense counsel, but suggested plaintiff could file 
a written motion for continuance prior to entry ofjudgment.4 Tr Vol. 1, p. 115, L. 19-25; Tr Vol. 
1, p. 116, L. 1-18. 
Judge Copsey issued an Order Awarding Costs on October 11,2013, following briefing. 
Sam does not specifically appeal the Order on its merits5 but addresses it herein because it 
reveals inappropriate fact-finding and commentary that Sam believes help prove the assertion 
that the judge failed to exhibit the required disinterest in the outcome of the case. The contest 
over defendants' cost bill was related to the fact that all of the costs the judge ultimately awarded 
were incurred with respect to the portion of defendants' motion for summary judgment on which 
Sam prevailed, namely, the issue whether the tort claim against defendants was timely filed. If 
the judge disagreed with Sam's argument, all she had to do was say that because defendants 
prevailed on the other portion of their motion, resulting in the striking of Sam's experts' 
affidavits and thus dismissal of the case, there was enough to justify the decision that defendants 
4 Noting that the Order Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial issued by Judge Copsey required motions for 
continuance to be made in writing, Sam's counsel filed such a motion, intended to serve jointly as a motion for 
reconsideration, prior to entry of the judgment. Hearing was finally held on that motion on October 10. 
5 Of course, if the Court reinstates Sam's claims and remands them for trial, the Order would be appropriately 
nullified. 
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were the prevailing party and as such entitled to all of their costs. Instead, the Order issued by 
the judge launched into an extensive recitation of facts (entitled "FACTUAL 
BACKGROUND"), virtually all of which were irrelevant to a decision on costs in view of the 
court's prior dismissal of the claim, and a number of which were disputed. R Vol. 1, pp. 
000758-000762. In essence, the judge issued findings of fact, or conclusions of law, without the 
benefit of live testimony or argument. 
Examples of the court's recitations may be instructive. In the first paragraph entitled 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND, the court stated that "When Zylstra joined the wrestling team as a 
heavy weight, he signed liability waivers each year releasing Boise State from any claims for 
damages or injuries sustained while participating in athletics." R Vol. 1, p. 000758, L. 22-24. 
This assertion clearly was not necessary to an understanding of the award of costs, or relevant to 
it. It leaves the impression that Sam had no legal basis for his claims at all despite the fact Sam 
believes strongly that the waivers he signed did not apply to the kind of injuries for which he was 
seeking damages. His position has always been that the waivers applied only to the risks of 
injury inherent in the athletic activity itself, such as the risk of his initial concussion. He believes 
the waivers did not contemplate the risk that his school's athletic trainer, who had the 
responsibility for his health and well-being upon his suffering an initial injury during competitive 
action, would violate the standard of care with respect to head injuries and expose him to much 
greater injuries by allowing him to continue wrestling. 
In the second paragraph of the FACTUAL BACKGROUND section of the Order 
Awarding Costs, the trial judge noted Sam's brief use of steroids months before the wrestling 
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tournament and asserted he never told his coaches about his steroid use. R Vol. 1, p. 000758, L. 
25-27. Again, these facts had nothing to do with the issues before the Court and had no 
demonstrated relevance to the underlying Motion for Summary Judgment as there is no evidence 
that his brief steroid use contributed to his injuries. Interestingly, the court also failed to 
acknowledge the evidence from Sam's own deposition that he had told a lifting coach he had 
taken steroids and that he had previously been encouraged by one of his wrestling coaches to use 
steroids. R Vol. 1, p. 000199 [L. 10-23 on deposition p. 150]; R Vol. 1, p. 000201 [L. 19-25 on 
deposition p. 158, and L. 1-15 on deposition p. 159]. 
In the third paragraph of the FACTUAL BACKGROUND section, the court asserted that 
after Sam had been thrown to the mat and suffered his initial injury, he and his coach "motioned 
to the referee asking for a time out." R Vol. 1, p. 000758, L. 29-30. Whether Sam actually 
motioned for a timeout was never established, nor is it really relevant to any issue the judge was 
asked to decide, although she may have felt that it undermined the contention that Sam had 
suffered a concussion at that time. Further in the same paragraph the court stated that Sam's 
symptoms had "cleared almost immediately" during the timeout called on his behalf after the 
initial injury. R Vol. 1, p. 000759, L. 1-5. That assertion was contested and certainly never 
established and again seems to be an attempt to express the court's opinion of his claim. The 
judge accepted the contentions of the athletic trainer justifying his decision to allow Sam to 
continue wrestling even though she had not been asked to decide whether his decision had been 
justified, and it was inappropriate to do so at that time. The trainer himself had completed a 
report on the day of the match confirming that Sam had complained of headache, confusion, and 
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dizziness (R Vo1. 1, pp. 000341-000342), which Sam, through his experts, has asserted required 
that he be withdrawn from action immediately. The judge's choice to engage in such fact-
finding, on issues she had not been asked to decide and that she should not have decided at that 
time (because a jury had been demanded), certainly enhances the impression that she was not 
appropriately disinterested about the outcome of the case. 
Judge Copsey's Order contains an additional two full pages of recitations of "facts" that 
have no relevance either to defendants' request for costs or their motion for summary judgment. 
Some of the assertions rehash the court's assessment of the deficiencies of Sam's expert 
disclosures, again stating that the Court "clearly and unequivocally" warned Sam at the hearing 
on the Motion to Compel in May that "merely stating the general subject matter - causation of 
any potential testimony was not sufficient to meet the discovery request" (R Vol. 1, p.000761, L. 
8-10), again leaving the impression that Sam had been guilty of merely stating the general 
subject matter in the disclosures he had already made, which was clearly not true as to Dr. 
Epperson, Sam's liability expert Bill Drake, and his economist, Bill Brandt. 
Sam's undersigned counsel argued that because he believed there had been adequate 
disclosure, and because he understood, in particular, that defense counsel was not objecting to 
the level of disclosure regarding Dr. Epperson's opinions, Sam was surprised that defendants 
asserted in their motion for summary judgment that there was no evidence of medical causation. 
During the hearing on Sam's Motion for ContinuancelReconsideration, the court said "So if you 
did not expect causation to be an issue, which is, quite frankly, an amazing statement as far as 
I'm concerned .... " Tr Vol. 1, p. 138, L. 23-25. She later stated that "I think it's quite surprising 
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to learn for the first time in the motion practice, and, of course, today that for some reason the 
plaintiff believed that causation was not an issue." Tr Vol. 1, p. 149, L. 15-19. In fact, Sam's 
undersigned counsel had stated at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, on August 
8, that "We did not know in advance ... that the motion was going to include medical causation. 
That was somewhat of a surprise." Tr Vol. 1, p. 45, L. 23-25; Tr Vol. 1, p. 46, L. 1. Shortly 
after that statement was made, the judge lectured that "with due respect counsel, you have 
always - you have always known that causation was something that you would have to prove. It 
is not up to them to go out and discover and do your work for you. So you had to prove 
causation." Tr Vol. 1, p. 46, L. 15-20. When the issue was raised again at the October 10 
hearing, as noted above, she expressed amazement again and acted as if Sam was making the 
assertion for the first time. Of course, counsel never meant to suggest that causation was 
unimportant or did not need to be proved at trial. Causation had been addressed explicitly in the 
original claim letter submitted to defendants in October 2010. The point was that he did not 
expect defense counsel to waste time on the causation issue on a summary judgment motion 
when he was confident defendants knew what Dr. Epperson's opinions were on that issue. The 
only issue he was confident would be addressed, if defendants filed a motion for summary 
judgment, was the timeliness issue, as that was the only issue defense counsel had ever 
threatened to raise on summary judgment with Sam's counsel, to the best oftheir recollection. 
The trial judge's response to Sam's Motion for ContinuancelReconsideration also 
suggested failure to follow applicable legal principles and the absence of disinterest in other 
ways. At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Judge Copsey had ruled that in her 
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opinion there was sufficient evidence, in the form of affidavits from Sam's lay witnesses about 
their observations of his problems and dysfunction in the months immediately after his injuries, 
to raise genuine issues as to material facts regarding the timeliness issue; that is, at least under 
the reasoning of this Court's decision in Larson, supra, a jury could decide in effect that Sam 
had suffered from a sufficient incapacity for months after the tournament to toll the 
commencement of the 180-day period for filing his claim. As far as Sam could tell, Judge 
Copsey's decision correctly decided that the lay witness testimony alone was sufficient to raise 
these genuine issues, as the judge had stricken Sam's experts' affidavits in their entirety. Tr 
Vol. 1, p. 104, L. 11-21; R Vol. 1, p. 000730. The written Order granting, in part, defendants' 
motion to strike stated that the motion striking "portions of the affidavits of Randall Epperson 
and Daniel Brzusek which contain previously undisclosed expert opinions is granted. 
Accordingly, the affidavits of Randall Epperson and Daniel Brzusek are stricken from the 
record.,,6 R Vol. 1, p. 000730. 
At the hearing on Sam's Motion for ContinuancelReconsideration, the court seemed to 
reverse herself on the evidence required to support Sam's position on the timeliness issue. She 
said the following in response to counsel's statement that he believed the lay testimony was, in 
fact, sufficient on that issue, responding to the judge's ruling that what she considered a "new" 
opinion from Dr. Epperson on that issue should be stricken. The court stated as follows: 
6 There is no question that the affidavits contained opinions that had been previously disclosed, so the court's 
remarks would have suggested those portions would have survived the motion to strike, but the concluding remark 
quoted above strikes the affidavits from the record without clarification on that subject. 
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Well, quite frankly, Counsel, I went out on a very long limb to deny summary 
judgment on that issue. Lay people can have certain opinions, but they certainly 
cannot opine as to medical issues, especially issues that are not readily apparent. 
Concussions and the effects of concussions is clearly a medical issue. The only 
reason you survived summary judgment, and it was barely, is because I found that 
there was an inference that was raised by the existence of some of the lay 
testimony that suggested that he was having some memory problems. But I can 
assure you, memory problems in and of themselves by themselves would not 
justify a failure to comply with the Tort Claims Act. So for you to now argue for 
first time that you were surprised that you would have to support your timeliness 
issue with some sort of expert testimony really surprises me. 
Tr Vol. 1, p. 140, L. 3-21. In later remarks the judge elaborated on this point, assessing the kind 
of evidence necessary to prove compliance with the time requirements of the Tort Claims Act: 
That, contrary to the argument I heard today, cannot be established simply by lay 
people. I did some research. I don't think either party really looked at the 
research. There aren't very many cases that find that there - - that a person is 
incompetent for the purposes for being incapable of escaping the requirements of 
the Tort Claims Act. The only case that I was able to find that seemed to have 
some applicability was an Alaska case and in there, while it's true there was some 
lay testimony, there also has to be expert testimony as well. Simply having lay 
people say he had memory problems, he didn't seem to be himself is not 
sufficient to avoid the requirements of the Tort Claims Act. 
Tr Vol. 1, p. 150, L. 19-25; Tr Vol. 1, p. 151, L. 1-10. 
The merits of the judge's position on the timeliness issue will undoubtedly be addressed 
on defendants' cross-appeal. For now, it will presumably be enough to say that Sam disagrees 
with what he thinks Judge Copsey was saying in the quoted language above. More to the point, 
it seems a complete reversal of the position she articulated in her ruling on the motion for 
summary judgment. She had already stricken Dr. Epperson's affidavit when she denied 
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defendants' motion on the timeliness issue, indicating her belief then that medical testimony was 
not essential to support Sam's timeliness claims. Perhaps the judge was simply manifesting 
again at the hearing on the Motion for ContinuancelReconsideration her personal opinions of the 
merits of Sam's claim as she understood it. Either way, the hearing was not the time to address 
the timeliness issue at all, as the motion for reconsideration addressed only the striking of Sam's 
experts' affidavits, and the judge's comments do not seem consistent with her obligation to 
remain disinterested in the outcome of the case. 
Another puzzling instance of apparent bias occurred at the very beginning of the hearing 
on the Motion for ContinuancelReconsideration. The judge asked Mr. Whitehead whether he 
ever had Sam sign the motion for continuance. At the time counsel did not remember whether he 
had done so, or even whether it was required, and said so, to which Judge Copsey replied that 
she could not find anything that suggests he had secured Sam's signature. Tr Vol. 1, p. 119, L. 
3-18. Later during the hearing, the judge returned to this issue and reminded counsel that the 
Order Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial required signature by the client, discovering by 
that point, however, that counsel had in fact signed "for" Sam: 
And I first want to point out that in the trial order on the motion to continue, the 
Court made it very clear. It says, "Continuances are discretionary with the Court 
and they will be granted only under extraordinary circumstances," -- and I want to 
emphasize this - "not within the control of the parties and not foreseeable." Not 
within the control of the parties and not foreseeable. "Continuances will be 
granted sparingly and only in those circumstances where obstacles proceeding 
with the case cannot be resolved by any other means other than granting a 
continuance." Now, I'll note requests for continuances are supposed to be signed 
by the client. In this case, Mr. Whitehead, you wrote on your document - you 
actually signed it and said it's on behalf of the client and you said that this was by 
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telephone. Now, I don't really think that's - I don't really think that's sufficient 
because the reason we do that is to ensure that the client is well aware that his or 
her attorney is requesting a continuance." 
Tr Vol. 1, p. 146, L. 22-25; Tr Vol. 1, p. 147, L. 1-19. By the time the hearing was held, the 
court had been provided a memorandum clarifying that Sam really had never wanted a 
continuance but felt compelled to seek it given the judge's remarks at the hearing on the motion 
for summary judgment when she said a continuance was the only way she would allow the case 
to go to trial given the prejudice Sam's "late" disclosure of his experts' opinions had caused 
defendants. She also had announced immediately after counsel requested the continuance that 
Sam could file a written motion that she would presumably consider if it was filed prior to the 
entry of judgment. Counsel accordingly had to move quickly. He called Sam (who was at horne 
in Iowa) and explained what had happened and asked for his authority to request a continuance, 
which Sam gave him. The fact and date of the authority were noted on the Motion. Given the 
Court's imminent deadline, counsel is at a loss to know what else he could have done. Sam did 
not have access to a scanner and could not have forwarded a signed document to counsel in time 
for inclusion with the Motion. In short, it is submitted this is an example of the judge's looking 
for mistakes by Sam or his counsel. At most, it is another example of an error that the Court was 
obliged to disregard unless it affected the substantial rights of the parties. Schmechel, supra. It 
cannot seriously be argued that the failure to obtain Sam's actual signature affected the 
substantial rights of defendants. 
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G. This Court's Decisions Support Sam's Request to Remand this Case. 
Research of Idaho law on the abuse of discretion standard suggests a high bar for 
obtaining a reversal of a trial judge's decision. Sam respectfully submits that this is a case where 
that outcome is justified, however, believing salient facts from this case distinguish it from other 
cases where the trial judge's decision was not overturned. One of the important recent cases 
discussing this issue is the Edmunds case, supra, previously mentioned. 
The trial court judge discussed the Edmunds case in her oral remarks at the hearing on 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. She warned it would be easy to misunderstand why 
the Edmunds case is so different from the instant case: 
So in looking at it, if you're not careful you would not understand that in the 
Edmunds case, when the district court struck the affidavit and was overturned by 
the Supreme Court, it was not it was because the trial judge in that case decided 
that matter on the basis of his own pre-trial order and not on a violation of 
discovery. And, in fact, in that case the Supreme Court talked about the fact that 
the defendant, St. Ai's, because it was - because the opinions had been disclosed 
eight months prior to the beginning of trial and while discovery was still 
appropriate, that they had ample time to further discover the - and to prepare and 
it was also done prior to their filing of their own experts, that they had ample time 
to do further discovery and to be able to have their own experts properly 
identified. That's not the case here. 
Tr Vol. 1, p. 69, L. 22-25; Tr Vol. 1, p. 70, L. 1-14. Sam submits Judge Copsey's analysis of the 
differences between Edmunds and this case is largely irrelevant. That is, whether Edmunds was 
decided on the basis of a violation of a pretrial order or on the basis of discovery violations is not 
important because the sanctions available for both alleged violations are the same, and the abuse 
of discretion test that would be applied to the court's decision is the same. The Court in 
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Edmunds stated that a "trial court has authority to sanction parties for non-compliance with 
pretrial orders, and sanctions may include those enumerated in I.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(B), (C), and (D) 
for discovery violations. I.R.c.P. 16(i). The imposition of such sanctions is committed to the 
discretion of the trial court, and we will not overturn such a decision absent a manifest abuse of 
that discretion." 142 Idaho at 872-873, 136 P.3d at 343-344. This Court in Edmunds did, 
however, overturn the trial court's decision to exclude an affidavit submitted by one of plaintiffs 
experts, Dr. Hollander. The decision suggests that Dr. Hollander's opinions had been 
supplemented eight months before trial, but it also states that the supplemental affidavit at issue, 
which apparently addressed for the first time his opinion about the local standard of care for 
pharmacists, had not been filed until almost a year after the discovery deadline for naming expert 
witnesses and two months before trial. In the instant case Dr. Epperson's opinion regarding 
causation was stated in the List of Experts, and thus by the deadline for naming expert witnesses, 
and filed more than 5 Yz months before trial, and the more complete statement of that opinion had 
been submitted in his affidavit a full three months before trial. The Court held that the change in 
Dr. Hollander's opinion affected only his credibility and therefore should not have been 
addressed by the trial judge in ruling on a motion for summary judgment and could not serve as 
the basis for striking his affidavit. Edmunds, supra, 142 Idaho at 874, 136 P.3d at 345. Sam 
submits that what Judge Copsey has done in this case is essentially what the Edmunds decision 
(and other decisions) have held impermissible; in the face of evidence that Dr. Epperson's 
opinion on causation had been disclosed before he submitted his July 1 affidavit, she nonetheless 
ruled it was "new" and untimely because she thought he was only reacting to the opinions of 
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defendants' experts, not clarifying and elaborating on an opinion he had already given. As such, 
the judge seems to have been evaluating Dr. Epperson's credibility, which at the summary 
judgment stage she is not allowed to do. See also Stanley v. Lennox Indus., Inc., 140 Idaho 785, 
789, 102 P.3d 1104, 1108 (2004). Even if this Court were to adopt Judge Copsey's view that Dr. 
Epperson's affidavit reflected a new opinion on causation, it should nonetheless have been 
admitted. As this Court stated in Edmunds, " ... Idaho law and rules of civil procedure 
contemplate that expert opinions can change and develop during the course of litigation." 
Edmunds, supra, 142 Idaho at 875, 136 P.3d at 346. Because defendants have never shown they 
were actually prejudiced by disclosure of Dr. Epperson's opinions on July 1, it was an abuse of 
discretion for the court to exclude his affidavit. The trial judge's decision to strike the affidavits 
was under any careful review of the record inconsistent with substantial justice. 
Summary of Argument 
The trial judge was guilty of a manifest abuse of discretion in striking the affidavits of 
both of Sam's medical experts, erroneously claiming without any evidence that Sam had engaged 
in trial-by-ambush tactics and further stating that the opinions contained in the affidavits Sam's 
experts submitted on July 1 were "new," when they were not. The judge erroneously held that 
Sam's disclosures denied defendants a fair opportunity to prepare fully for cross-examination of 
his experts and ignored Sam's reasonable belief that discovery had not closed when defendants 
filed their motion for summary judgment, a belief that was based on defendants' statements, 
actions, and inaction (including failure to disclose their own experts' opinions prior to filing their 
motion and their announcement of a new liability expert on July 12, long after they claim 
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discovery had closed, without apology or request for accommodation). Sam submits that it was 
his intention to supplement his discovery answers and expert disclosures shortly after his 
scheduled meeting with Dr. Daniel Brzusek on June 10, and that his doing so would have been 
seasonable under the circumstances. He also contends that the disclosures on July 1 and July 15, 
delayed by his need to focus his efforts on responding to defendants' motion for summary 
judgment, were also seasonable. 
Sam submits that the judge's decision to strike his experts' affidavits and dismiss his 
lawsuit must be overturned as a manifest abuse of the judge's discretion because the judge failed 
to act in accordance with applicable legal principles, by failing to properly base her decision on 
the evidence before her and by engaging in inappropriate fact-finding and assessment of the 
credibility of witnesses at the summary judgment stage, and further making misstatements of fact 
and law, and her decision cannot accordingly be said to have been reached through an exercise of 
reason. Her rulings and statements, made both orally at the various hearings and in writing, also 
reflect a serious failure to show the disinterest in the outcome of the case that the law requires of 
all judges, and that failure taints her decision so severely that it must be reversed. And, finally, 
dismissal of Sam's claim must be reversed as dismissal is clearly inconsistent with substantial 
justice. However this Court may view the actions or inaction of Sam's counsel, there is no 
reason why Sam must be punished under the circumstances. His claim is serious, his damages 
are severe, and he deserves his day in court before a jury of his peers. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons stated, Sam Zylstra respectfully requests that the judgment of the 
District Court dismissing his claim be reversed and the case be remanded for trial. Sam 
additionally requests that if the case be remanded, it be reassigned to another judge for further 
proceedings including trial. 
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